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i

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
:

v.

:

WILLIAM KEITH REIGENBORN,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

:

Case No. 20000113-CA
Priority No. 2

On appeal, Mr. William Reigenborn is challenging the trial court's denial of his motion to
continue the jury trial. Mr. Reigenborn maintains that the trial court's denial of a continuance
deprived him of his constitutional right to due process, denied him his sixth amendment right to
counsel, his constitutional right to compulsory process and his constitutional right to counsel of
his choosing.
In response to Mr. Reigenborn's arguments on appeal, the state claims the following:
With respect to the denial of a continuance, the state asserts that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in denying Mr. Reigenborn's motion to continue since the denial did not materially
prejudice Mr. Reigenborn and the result of the trial would not have been different had the
continuance been granted.
With respect to Mr. Reigenborn's claim that he was denied counsel of his choosing, the
state maintains that because Mr. Reigenborn was indigent, he was not entitled to counsel of his
own choosing.
With respect to Mr. Reigenborn's assertion that he was denied his Sixth Amendment

right to counsel, the state argues that the trial court's failure to inquire into Mr. Reigenbom's
complaints regarding appointed counsel does not constitute reversible error and in any event, Mr.
Reigenbom was provided effective assistance of counsel at trial.
With regard to Mr. Reigenbom's assertion that the trial court abused its discretion in
denying defense counsel's motion to withdraw, the state claims that because Mr. Reigenbom did
not hire private counsel, the court did not abuse its discretion in declining appointed counsel's
request to withdraw.
Finally, with regard to Mr. Reigenbom's assertion that he was denied his constitutional
right to compulsory process, the state argues that Mr. Reigenbom failed to present evidence that
the testimony of absent witnesses would have altered the outcome of the trial and therefore, his
right to compulsory process was not violated.

2

ARGUMENT
I.

THE STATE'S ARGUMENT THAT THE COURT'S DENIAL OF A
CONTINUANCE DID NOT CONSTITUTE AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION IS
UNPERSUASIVE BECAUSE MR. REIGENBORN WAS MATERIALLY
PREJUDICED BY THE DENIAL
In determining whether the trial court's denial of a defendant's request for a continuance

constitutes an abuse of discretion, the following factors must be considered:
[1] whether other continuances have been requested and granted; [2] the balanced
convenience or inconvenience to the litigants, witnesses, counsel, and the court;
[3] whether the requested delay is for legitimate reasons or whether it is dilatory,
purposeful, or contrived; [4] whether the defendant contributed to the
circumstance which gives rise to the request for a continuance;... [and 5]
whether denying the continuance will result in identifiable prejudice to
defendant's case, and if so, whether this prejudice is of a material or substantial
nature.
United States v. Burton. 584 F.2d 485, 490-91 (D.C.Cir. 1978) (quoted with approval in Lavton
City v. Longcrier. 946 P.2d 655, 659 (Utah App. 1997)). In order to demonstrate a clear abuse of
discretion, the moving party must demonstrate that it was "materially prejudiced by the court's
denial of the continuance or that the trial result would have been different had the continuance
been granted." State v. Oliver. 820 P.2d 474,476 (Utah App. 1991) (citing State v. Barker. 35
Wash.App. 3888, 667 P.2d 108, 114 (1983)).
A.

PRIOR CONTINUANCES

The state asserts that on May 20,1999, defense counsel requested a trial continuance.
(Resp. Brief pp. 2, 5.) However, this assertion is not supported by the record. As is often true,
multiple cases are set for jury trial on one day. The case which is highest in priority bumps other
cases from the trial calendar. For example, cases where an accused is in-custody take precedence
over those cases where the accused is out of custody. If there are no in-custody cases, then the
3

trial court will prioritize cases by the date of the alleged offense or the filing of the information.
If defense counsel has had no contact with a client whose case has highest priority, a jury
generally will not be called in unless there is a case of lesser priority which, based on the
representations of defense counsel and the state, will be proceeding to jury trial.
There is nothing in the May 20, 1999, transcript to indicate that Mr. Reigenbom's case
should have moved forward that day. Mr. Reigenbom was not in custody and there is no
indication from the court that Mr. Reigenbom's trial actually would have proceeded that day. It
is likely that either a jury was called in to hear a different matter that day which was higher in
priority than Mr. Reigenbom's case or that no jury was called in at all. So, in fact, there is
nothing in the record to demonstrate that Mr. Reigenbom requested and was granted a
continuance. Moreover, the transcript from May 20,1999, entitles the hearing as a "pretrial
conference." (Pretrial Conference Tr. p.l.)
The record does prove, however, that the court continued one jury trial setting (R. 20) and
the state continued another. (R. 25-30.) Certainly Mr. Reigenbom cannot be held responsible
for either the court's or the state's continuance and such continuances should not have been held
against Mr. Reigenbom when the court denied Mr. Reigenbom's request for a continuance.
B.

BALANCING OF INTERESTS

The trial court made no attempt to weigh the convenience or inconvenience of Mr.
Reigenbom, the state's witnesses, the attorneys or the court, in denying Mr. Reigenbom's motion
to continue. The state asserts that because the court informed Mr. Reigenbom that it did not wish
to continue the trial merely based on speculation that Mr. Reigenbom would be hiring private
counsel, such assertion constituted a balancing of interests. (Brief of Respondent p. 11.) Such a
4

statement by the trial court does not meet the court's obligation to balance the necessary interests
in determining whether a continuance is appropriate. There is nothing in the record to indicate
inconvenience to the witnesses, attorneys or the court, beyond that which was imposed by the
court's continuance and the state's continuance of the matter on prior occasions.

C.

REASON FOR REQUESTED DELAY

The State contends that Mr. Reigenbom's request for a continuance for the purpose of
hiring counsel is not legitimate because the court had previously informed Mr. Reigenborn that
the trial would go forward, regardless of whether private counsel had been retained. (Brief of
Respondent, p. 11.) The state further argues that Mr. Reigenbom's request for a continuance was
nothing more than an attempt to delay the proceedings.
Mr. Reigenborn informed the trial court of his desire to hire private counsel but also
informed the court that due to his work schedule, he was having a difficult time setting up a
meeting with the attorney he wished to hire. Mr. Reigenborn did not request a continuance in
order to meet with appointed counsel because he did not desire the assistance of appointed
counsel; he requested a continuance solely for the purpose of hiring private counsel to defend
him on the Assault charge.
Contrary to the state's assertions, there is nothing in the record to indicate that Mr.
Reigenborn sought to delay the trial in this matter merely for the purpose of delay. Mr.
Reigenborn expressed a legitimate reason for needing a continuance. Moreover, given the
mental health issues involved in this matter, it is not entirely clear that Mr. Reigenborn
understood the urgency of hiring private counsel and moving the case forward at a more rapid
pace.
5

D.

CIRCUMSTANCES LEADING TO REQUEST FOR CONTINUANCE

The state argues that because Mr. Reigenbom failed to contact defense counsel, he
contributed to the circumstances which precipitated the continuance request and for that reason,
the trial court properly denied Mr. Reigenbom's and defense counsel's motion to continue.
While it is true that Mr. Reigenbom's contacts with counsel were limited to their meetings on
scheduled court dates, it is also true that Mr. Reigenbom did not have any intention of
proceeding to trial with appointed counsel defending his case. Given this circumstance and Mr.
Reigenbom's clear desire to proceed to trial with counsel other than court-appointed counsel,
certainly it would not be reasonable to expect Mr. Reigenbom to attempt contact with appointed
counsel beyond the contact necessitated by specified court dates.
E.

MATERIAL PREJUDICE
i.

MR. REIGENBORN WAS MATERIALLY PREJUDICED BY
THE COURT'S DENIAL OF HIS MOTION FOR A
CONTINUANCE BECAUSE IT RESULTED IN THE DENIAL
OF HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL OF HIS CHOOSING

Mr. Reigenbom was entitled to counsel of his choosing and was denied his constitutional
right to counsel when the trial court denied his motion to continue. The court's denial of Mr.
Reigenbom's motion to continue deprived Mr. Reigenbom of both the opportunity and option of
hiring counsel of his choosing although Mr. Reigenbom had both the ability and the means to do
so.
When Mr. Reigenbom was initially brought before the court on the assault charge in the
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instant matter, he was unemployed and therefore indigent.1 However, at the time Mr.
Reigenbom expressed his desire to retain private counsel, he was no longer indigent. (PTC Tr. 2;
J.T. Tr. 4.) In fact, Mr. Reigenbom was driving a long-haul truck and earning an income
sufficient to permit him to hire private counsel. (J.T. Tr. 4.)
In response to Mr. Reigenbom's argument that he was denied counsel of his choosing, the
state appears to claim that because Mr. Reigenbom was indigent he was not entitled to his choice
of counsel. (See Brief of Appellant.) While it is true that an accused who is indigent is entitled
only to counsel as appointed by the court, an accused who is able to employ counsel has the right
to representation by an attorney of his or her choice. State v. Wulffenstein, 733 P.2d 120,121
(Utah 1986); Webster v. Jones. 587 P.2d 528, 530 (Utah 1978).
Here, Mr. Reigenbom expressed both his desire and ability to retain private counsel.
Because Mr. Reigenbom was not longer indigent at the time he expressed a desire to retain
private counsel of his own choosing, he was entitled to his choice of counsel. The right to
counsel of one's choosing is a component of an individual's Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel
and thus is of constitutional dimension. Id Certainly the denial of a constitutional right
constitutes material prejudice. Cf Utah R. Crim. P. 30 (a) ("Any error, defect, irregularity or
variance which does not affect the substantial rights of a party shall be disregarded.") Thus, the
trial court's failure to grant Mr. Reigenbom a continuance to retain counsel of his choosing
constituted an abuse of discretion and resulted in material prejudice to Mr. Reigenbom.

1

At the time of sentencing and the filing of this appeal, Mr. Reigenbom was unemployed
and indigent.
7

ii.

THE STATE'S ASSERTION THAT MR. REIGENBORN'S CONDUCT
PRECLUDED THE TRIAL COURT FROM INQUIRING INTO MR.
REIGENBORN'S COMPLAINTS CONCERNING COUNSEL
BOLSTERS MR. REIGENBORN'S ARGUMENT THAT HE WAS
DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL BY THE
COURT'S DENIAL OF A CONTINUANCE

As set forth in the opening Brief of Appellant, when a defendant alleges lack of
preparation by defense counsel as a basis for requesting a continuance, "[d]enying a continuance
may result in the violation of a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel." State v.
Cabututan, 861 P.2d 408,414 (Utah 1993).
[W]hen a complaint is registered by a criminal defendant concerning his or her
appointed counsel, the court must balance the potential for last minute delay and
the propensity for manipulation of the system against the competing concern
about the likely inability of indigent defendants to articulate and communicate
their dissatisfaction in a setting which most laypersons find quite intimidating.
State v. PursifelL 746 P.2d 270, 273 (Utah App. 1987). When such dissatisfaction is expressed,
the trial court must employ
reasonable, non-suggestive efforts to determine the nature of the defendant's
complaints and to apprise [sic] itself of the facts necessary to determine whether
the defendant's relationship with his or her appointed attorney has deteriorated to
the point that sound discretion requires substitution or even to such an extent that
his or her Sixth Amendment right to counsel would be violated but for
substitution. Even when the trial judge suspects that the defendant's requests are
disingenuous and designed solely to manipulate the judicial process and delay the
trial, perfunctory questioning is not sufficient.
14 (citing United States v. Weltv. 674 F.2d 185,187 (2d Cir. 1967)).
Mr. Reigenborn clearly expressed his concerns regarding court-appointed counsel to the
trial court. With respect to this concern, the following colloquy took place between the trial
court and Mr. Reigenborn:
MR. REIGENBORN: She won't subpoena anybody for me.
8

THE COURT: Well, I'm - - I'm - - let me - -1 - MR. REIGENBORN: She says she can't get ahold [sic] of somebody on
the phone. That - - she's got their address, subpoena them; I can't do nothing
without no witnesses.
THE COURT: Well, [defense counsel] has been appointed to represent
you. She's the professional and I expect her and I'm sure she will proceed - MR. REIGENBORN: I've told her several times to subpoena people for
me - THE COURT: When I'm speaking, I need you to be quiet, while I'm
speaking. Let me tell you what the rules of the - - of the situation are going to be.
We're going to have a trial today. [Defense counsel] is going to represent
you. We're going to empanel a jury and we're going to hear the witnesses. If-if, at any point, you act up, then I'll remove you from the courtroom, we'll
proceed in the trial without your presence.
(J.T. Tr. 5-6.)
The state claims that Mr. Reigenbom's own behavior caused the trial court's lack of
inquiry and therefore Mr. Reigenborn was not denied counsel and the lack of inquiry does not
constitute reversible error. However, Mr. Reigenbom's behavior should have signaled to the trial
court that Mr. Reigenbom harbored serious concerns about appointed counsel's representation
and that Mr. Reigenbom may be suffering from a mental defect or illness.
There is nothing in this Court's opinion in Pursifell to support the state's claim that the
trial court may be relieved of its inquiry obligation if a defendant exhibits behavior which the
State deems "inappropriate". Here, the trial court did not engage Mr. Reigenbom in the type of
questioning designed to get to the heart of his complaints with respect to counsel and the state
even concedes that such an inquiry was not conducted. (See Brief of Respondent p. 15: "In Mr.
Reigenbom's case, the trial court's lack of inquiry was not reversible error."). Thus, the state's
9

argument hinges on its claim that the court's failure to inquire did not constitute reversible error.
The state argues that "Ms. Sisneros [sic] inability to contact witnesses or failure to
subpoena witnesses does not indicate a lack of preparation." (Brief of Respondent p. 15.) Mr.
Reigenborn has not asserted ineffective assistance of counsel, but is claiming that he was denied
counsel both because of the deterioration of his limited relationship with defense counsel and the
lack of communication between himself and defense counsel which led to a lack of investigation
and preparation for the trial of Mr. Reigenbom's case.2
The state has failed to identify any inquiry by the trial court that would even remotely
qualify as adequate under Pursifell and has instead twisted Mr. Reigenbom's argument into one
of ineffective assistance of counsel, which has never been Mr. Reigenbom's claim. There is
simply nothing in the record to indicate that the trial court made any attempt to inquire into Mr.
Reigenbom's relationship with defense counsel and whether such relationship had deteriorated to
the point that Mr. Reigenborn had been denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Clearly
the relationship between defense counsel and Mr. Reigenborn had deteriorated to an extent that,
at a minimum, the trial court should have inquired into Mr. Reigenbom's complaints. The
failure to do so constitutes reversible error because it resulted in the denial of Mr. Reigenbom's
Sixth Amendment Right to counsel.

2

Notably, all contact between Mr. Reigenborn and defense counsel was limited to their
meetings on scheduled court dates. There was never a face-to-face office meeting between the
two and all information defense counsel obtained about Mr. Reigenbom's case, including
possible witnesses, was limited to conversations she had with Mr. Reigenborn on the set court
dates. As previously explained, Mr. Reigenborn intended to hire private counsel.
10

iii.

MR. REIGENBORN HAS DEMONSTRATED THAT MS. SNIPES'
MOTHER WOULD HAVE PROVIDED MATERIAL AND RELEVANT
TESTIMONY THAT WAS VITAL TO HIS DEFENSE OF
DIMINISHED CAPACITY

As set forth in the opening Brief of Appellant, Mr. Reigenbom would have called Ms.
Snipes' mother both to undermine Ms. Snipes' credibility and to demonstrate a pattern of
harassment and provocation by Ms. Snipes of Mr. Reigenbom, information that would have
bolstered Mr. Reigenbom's defense of diminished mental capacity and the inability to form the
specific intent required for the offense of assault.
The state seems to claim that in order to demonstrate the denial of compulsory process,
Mr. Reigenbom must show that his witness would have provided material testimony that would
changed the outcome of the trial. Moreover, the state apparently claims that because Mr.
Reigenbom knew of his trial date, he had sufficient time to contact witnesses to testify on his
behalf sans counsel.
In order to demonstrate a violation of the constitutional right to compulsory process, a
defendant must make some plausible showing that the testimony of the absent witness "would
have been both material and favorable to his defense." State v. Schreuder, 712 P.2d 264, 274
(Utah 1985) (quoting United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal 458 U.S. 858, 873, 102 S. Ct. 3440,
3449, 73 L.Ed. 2d 1193 (1982) (footnote omitted)). Testimony is deemed material and its
exclusion prejudicial "if there is a reasonable probability that its presence would affect the
outcome of the trial." Id.
Mr. Reigenbom has already demonstrated how the testimony of Ms. Snipes' mother
would undermine Ms. Snipes' credibility and bolster Mr. Reigenbom's defense of diminished
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capacity. Such a defense would certainly call into question Mr. Reigenbom's ability to form the
specific intent required for the jury to find him guilty of assault. Accordingly, the testimony of
Ms. Snipes' mother was material, relevant and would have affected the outcome of the trial in
that it would have negated Mr. Reigenbom's intent, an essential element of assault, a specific
intent offense.
Moreover, although Mr. Reigenbom would personally have subpoena authority if he were
representing himself, he does not possess such authority when he is represented by counsel. See
Utah R. Crim. Proc. Rule 14 (a). Such authority is vested in defense counsel and is utilized at
counsel's discretion. The state cannot seriously expect an accused who is represented by
counsel to conduct his or her own investigation on a case, particularly where the accused
anticipates relieving appointed counsel of his or her duties by retaining private counsel.
II.

THE STATE'S ASSERTION THAT THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED
DEFENSE COUNSEL'S REQUEST TO WITHDRAW BECAUSE PRIVATE
COUNSEL HAD NOT ENTERED AN APPEARANCE FAILS TO TAKE INTO
ACCOUNT THE DETERIORATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
APPOINTED COUNSEL AND MR. REIGENBORN
The state asserts that because private counsel never entered an appearance, the trial court

did not abuse its discretion in denying appointed counsel's motion to withdraw from
representation of Mr. Reigenbom. The state also claims that any deterioration in the attorneyclient relationship is the fault of Mr. Reigenbom for failing to contact appointed counsel and that
he lacked good cause for failing to cooperate with counsel.
A trial court's grant or denial of counsel's motion to withdraw in a criminal case is
discretionary and will be reversed only for an abuse of discretion. State v. Scales, 946 P.2d 377
(Utah App. 1997); Utah Code Jud. Admin. R4-604(1)(B) ("A motion to withdraw as an attorney
12

in a criminal case shall be made in open court with the defendant present unless otherwise
ordered by the court.").
Defense counsel informed the trial court of Mr. Reigenbom's desire to retain private
counsel and the court heard directly from Mr. Reigenbom with regard to his complaints about
defense counsel. Mr. Reigenbom expressed the following concerns to the court:
MR. REIGENBORN: She won't subpoena anybody for me.
THE COURT: Well, I'm - - I'm - - let me - -1 - MR. REIGENBORN: She says she can't get ahold [sic] of somebody on
the phone. That - - she's got their address, subpoena them; I can't do nothing
without no witnesses.
THE COURT: Well, [defense counsel] has been appointed to represent
you. She's the professional and I expect her and I'm sure she will proceed - MR. REIGENBORN: I've told her several times to subpoena people for
me - THE COURT: When I'm speaking, I need you to be quiet, while I'm
speaking. Let me tell you what the rules of the - - of the situation are going to be.
We're going to have a trial today. [Defense counsel] is going to represent
you. We're going to empanel a jury and we're going to hear the witnesses. If - if, at any point, you act up, then I'll remove you from the courtroom, we'll
proceed in the trial without your presence.
(J.T. Tr. 5-6.) This exchange demonstrates Mr. Reigenbom's concerns about being represented
by appointed counsel. Clearly, from Mr. Reigenbom's perspective, the attorney-client
relationship had deteriorated to the point where Mr. Reigenbom did not believe counsel could or
would adequately represent his interests.
Moreover, the state's reliance on State v. Scales. 946 P.2d 377, 383 (Utah App. 1997) is
misplaced. Scales involved an instance where the defendant was represented by court-appointed
13

counsel and the defendant had argued that his relationship with court-appointed counsel had
deteriorated to the extent that the attorney-client relationship had been compromised. The
defendant sought appointment of new counsel due to the deterioration of his relationship with his
then appointed counsel. Appointed counsel moved to withdraw from representation of the
defendant but the trial court denied the motion because the defendant had failed to demonstrate
good cause for declining to cooperate with appointed counsel. This Court upheld the trial court's
decision, concluding that the relationship between appointed counsel and the defendant had
deteriorated because of the defendant's failure to cooperate. This Court further found that the
defendant lacked good cause for refusing to cooperate with appointed counsel.
It appears that the good cause standard set forth in Scales applies only to those instances
where a defendant seeks to have appointed counsel replaced by other appointed counsel, not to
instances where a defendant seeks to have court-appointed counsel replaced by private counsel.
As previously noted, an indigent accused is entitled to counsel, but not necessarily to his or her
choice of counsel; however, an accused who retains private counsel is entitled to his or her
choice of counsel. Because an accused who retains private counsel is entitled to his or choice of
counsel, the accused need not demonstrate good cause in order to replace one private attorney
with another; the court simply does not become involved in the decision of an accused to hire or
fire his or her private counsel. However, where the accused is indigent and counsel is appointed,
the accused is not entitled to his or her choice of counsel and the court must find conflict between
an indigent accused and appointed counsel (good cause) before appointing new counsel.
Here, defense counsel and Mr. Reigenborn were not asking the trial court to appoint new
counsel, they were merely requesting a continuance so that Mr. Reigenborn could retain private
14

counsel. The minimal relationship established between defense counsel and Mr. Reigenbom had
deteriorated to the extent that Mr. Reigenbom desired to hire private counsel to represent his
interests. Because Mr. Reigenbom was not indigent at the time he sought private counsel, he
was entitled to counsel of his choosing and the trial court abused its discretion in declining to
grant a continuance so that Mr. Reigenbom could obtain private counsel. See supra argument
I.E.i.
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CONCLUSION
Appellant William Keith Reigenborn respectfully requests that this Court reverse his
conviction and remand this case for a new trial.
SUBMITTED this ^ - d a y of September, 2000.

1;

.>

SHANNON N. ROMERO
- Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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